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# Effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the Finnish model of comprehensive security

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Markus Kari<sup>1</sup>

## 1 Introduction

Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has turned into one of the biggest watershed moments of our time. Along with the COVID-19 pandemic, it will define how Europe is depicted in the histories of this era. I personally believe that historical analyses of many areas of our life in the early 2020s will be divided into the time before the coronavirus outbreak and the time after the pandemic, and, on the other hand, into the time before Russia's attack on Ukraine and the time after the invasion.

When this article comes out, almost two years will have passed since Russia's attack and the start of Ukraine's fight for survival. It will be years before historical analysis of the causes and consequences of the events can begin. The first overviews of the reasons behind the war and its nature have already been published, however, and the effects of the war are being studied on many fronts.<sup>2</sup>

One area where Russia's invasion is having a big impact are the foreign and security policies of European countries. Finland's approach to defending against external threats also changed very quickly in the spring of 2022. Previous hesitations about joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vanished practically overnight.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The author is an Associate Professor of Legal History at the University of Helsinki and a Ministerial Adviser at the Finnish Ministry of Finance.

<sup>2</sup> One of the best initial studies into the background of Russia's invasion and the forms of Ukrainian defence is Luke Harding's 'Invasion: Russia's Bloody War and Ukraine's Fight for Survival', published in Finland by Into Kustannus in 2023.

<sup>3</sup> Finland's sudden progression from the so-called NATO option to full membership has sparked much-needed verbal and written debate. Historical analysis accumulates in stages, and we are now at the stage where those who have been personally involved are speaking out about their experiences and voicing their opinions. See, in particular, Risto E J Penttilä – Jyrki Karvinen: *Pitkä tie Natoon* [A Long Road to NATO], Otava, 2023; and Lauri Nurmi: *Suomen salattu tie Natoon* [Finland's Secret Path to NATO], Into Kustannus, 2023.

What the general public are yet to start debating and writing about are the effects of the war on Finland's holistic approach to security. Finland and Finland's representatives have often identified the concept of 'comprehensive security' as being unique to our country: Finland's political choices take into account 'all security-related elements that, if threatened, could cause serious harm or danger to the public or society'.<sup>4</sup> This broad perspective covers both threats posed by war and other human action and threats that are independent of humans.<sup>5</sup> The holistic approach lies at the heart of the Finnish model of joint preparedness. Comprehensive security therefore describes, on the one hand, Finland's ideal scenario in which all threats targeted at society's vital functions can be controlled holistically. On the other hand, the word 'comprehensive' also means that the model applies equally to all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities.<sup>6</sup> It could also be said that all public authorities are security authorities in the sense that they have to, in their own operations, be prepared for serious crises and emergencies.<sup>7</sup>

My aim with this article is to shed light on the ongoing reform of the Finnish model of comprehensive security. I focus on two issues that I consider significant in this respect, both of which have linkages to the situation in Ukraine and the lessons to be learned from that crisis. The first is the NATO concept of civil resilience. Our new alliance inescapably means that any improvements to Finland's comprehensive security can no longer be planned purely from the premise of national objectives, with a touch of compliance with EU laws thrown into the mix. Finland now also has to take into consideration the obligations and opportunities that come with NATO membership and factor in NATO's own rapidly changing aspirations to strengthen civil resilience.<sup>8</sup> The second issue that I consider significant lies closer to home: the Finnish government is working on a number of strategic policies that will have huge implications for our society's comprehensive security. The lessons that can be learned from the total war experienced by Ukraine need to be given careful consideration during this process.

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<sup>4</sup> Vocabulary of comprehensive security, Finnish Terminology Centre TSK, Helsinki, 2017, p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, Publications of the Finnish Government 2020:30, p. 22: 'Finland examines security from a wide perspective that observes not only the military threats, competition between great powers and hybrid influencing but also the impacts of the global challenges currently in sight, such as climate change, health threats, human rights violations, migration, economic crises, increasing inequality, terrorism and international crime.'

<sup>6</sup> Security Strategy for Society, Government Resolution, 2 November 2017, p. 5. See, for example, Petri Toivonen: The concept for Comprehensive Security, Baltic Rim Economies, May 2023, Issue #2.

<sup>7</sup> For more information about the model of comprehensive security, see, in particular, Minna Branders: Kokonainen turvallisuus? Kokonaisturvallisuuden poliittinen kelpoisuus ja hallinnollinen toteutettavuus [Holistic security? Political viability and administrative operability of the concept of comprehensive security], Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 2124, Tampere University Press, Tampere, 2016. Branders demonstrates how academics have struggled to make sense of the concept of comprehensive security, which is 'analytically unclear, multifaceted and complex ... as well as having a rather fragile scientific identity' (p. 119).

<sup>8</sup> It is difficult to come up with an exact definition of 'resilience'; in this context, it refers to the ability of society or a segment of society to deal with a major crisis – to remain functional, to adapt and to bounce back.

## 2 The situation before the spring of 2022

We should first cast our minds back to what the Finnish model of comprehensive security was like at the start of 2022. The most helpful official document in this respect is the Security Strategy for Society from 2017. This strategic document, which was issued in the form of a Government Resolution, defines comprehensive security as the ‘Finnish model of joint preparedness’. The model is based on the premise that, in practice, all public authorities are security authorities. Comprehensive security is all about cooperation: businesses, non-governmental organisations and citizens are also expected to shoulder their share of the responsibility. What that responsibility entails is ensuring vital functions – functions that are essential for the functioning of society and that must be maintained in all situations. The Security Strategy for Society uses the shape of a diamond to illustrate interdependencies between the vital functions: leadership; international and EU activities; defence capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; and psychological resilience.<sup>9</sup> The vital functions are further divided into 57 strategic tasks of government departments. These strategic tasks ultimately define how not only ministries, but also local authorities and other legally competent operators are expected to prepare and plan for contingencies.

On top of this strategic layer lies a layer of mandatory laws. One of the key concepts in the system of comprehensive security is ‘preparedness’, which the 2017 Security Strategy for Society defines as ‘activities ensuring that all tasks can continue with minimum interruptions and that the required exceptional measures can be performed during disruptions occurring in normal conditions and during emergencies.’<sup>10</sup> In other words, these are actions that must be taken ‘while the sun is shining’, before it is too late. Particularly significant in this context is the Finnish Emergency Powers Act (1552/2011), section 12 of which gives the authorities a broad obligation to prepare for emergencies and section 13 of which puts ministries in charge of preparedness in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition to the Emergency Powers Act, there are a number of other national laws, such as the Rescue Act and various sector-specific regulations, that lay down preparedness obligations that are critical to comprehensive security and that also apply to the private sector. The authorities’ preparedness obligations also extend to ensuring that each authority stays in charge of its area of competence in times of crisis: there is no special crisis administration that would take over. Instead, the authorities must be always ready to adapt to any change in their operating environment.<sup>11</sup>

Comprehensive security also plays a key role in Finland’s foreign and security policy. The most recent Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, from 2020, identifies the model of comprehensive security as one of the key elements of Finnish security.<sup>12</sup>

The rapid change in Finland’s foreign and security policy in the spring of 2022 is evident from a government report on changes in the security environment, which was published in

<sup>9</sup> Security Strategy for Society 2017, pp. 14–24.

<sup>10</sup> Security Strategy for Society 2017, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> For a legal perspective, see Antti Belinskij – Niko Soininen – Kaisa Huhta: The Legal Resilience of Water, Food and Energy Security in Finland, Edilex, December 2017, [www.edilex.fi/artikkelit/18356](http://www.edilex.fi/artikkelit/18356). The writers analyse the resilience of water, food and energy security in Finland and systematise the resilience of the legal regulation of these sectors. They also describe the Finnish model of regulatory resilience.

<sup>12</sup> Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020, especially pp. 16, 24 and 33.

April 2022. The document played a crucial role in the process of Finland's joining NATO. What is particularly interesting about the document is that it not only analysed the change in the security environment that had taken place following Russia's invasion of Ukraine but also explained, in detail, how Finland applies the model of comprehensive security to prepare for effects on the economy, security of supply, hybrid influence activities by state actors, cyber security and critical infrastructure.<sup>13</sup> Compared to the 2020 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, comprehensive security was portrayed as a deep-rooted strategic concept that also guides operational activities. As soon as Russia's aggressive politics and its direct implications became clear, Finland's response to the changed security environment was reflected in the government report: 'The threshold for externally exerting influence on Finnish society will be heightened by means of *preparedness in different administrative branches in line with the model for comprehensive security* and by means of citizens' resilience to crisis.'<sup>14</sup>

Although the Finnish model of comprehensive security was originally built on national perspectives, the 'diamond' also factors in international and EU activities. Prior to Finland's accession to NATO, the European Union provided the country with, among many other benefits, an important security policy framework. From the perspective of the Finnish model of comprehensive security, the most significant element of the EU's harmonised foreign and security policy is the non-military approach to preparing for major crises, cyber-attacks and hybrid influence activities.

The EU's crisis preparedness is enshrined in the Treaties, namely Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, which provides for mutual assistance. It obligates the Member States to give each other aid and assistance 'by all the means in their power'. Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also provides for solidarity and stipulates that 'the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster'. The adoption of these provisions is a political choice, and there are differing views on just how much they contribute to the EU's security policy.

The EU has strived to concretise the provisions of the Treaties over the last decade or so by heavily modernising its crisis preparedness mechanisms. The core objective is to improve the resilience of the Union and its Member States. The EU has recognised 'hybrid threats' as one of its key security concepts since the middle of the last decade.<sup>15</sup> Although the Union was not created to be a crisis management organisation, it now has predetermined, formalised and well-rehearsed decision-making processes in the event of a crisis: these are known as the EU Hybrid Toolbox and the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox. Responses to crises are coordinated with the help of not only the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) but also a mechanism known as Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR). The EU has also developed a number of practical tools for dealing with crises. Examples include the EU Civil Pro-

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<sup>13</sup> Government report on changes in the security environment, Publications of the Finnish Government 2022:20 (Report 2022:20), especially the description sheet.

<sup>14</sup> Report 2022:20, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> For more information about European developments up to the year 2018, see Tiina Ferm: 'Ajankohtaisista EU:n hybridiuhkien torjunnasta' ['Latest news on the EU's response to hybrid threats'], *Defensor Legis* No 3/2018, pp. 404–419. By that point, hybrid threats were already a key concept in security terminology and high on the EU's agenda. The primary reason was Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea.

tection Mechanism (UCPM) and its rescEU reserve as well as the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). On a political level, it was the 2020 Industrial Strategy that first incorporated the perspective of security of supply in its analysis of strategic dependencies.<sup>16</sup>

The framework has been heavily revised in recent years. Russia's attack on Ukraine was the final wake-up call that the EU needed to electrify its sluggish regulation processes and expand its role as a security operator. The Commission had already made a number of legislative proposals before the 2022 invasion, such as a proposal for a regulation on serious cross-border threats to health (COM(2020) 727 final), a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code (COM(2021) 891 final) and a proposal for a comprehensive package of measures encompassing the Critical Entities Resilience Directive ('CER', (EU) 2022/2557), an update to the Network and Information Security Directive ('NIS 2', (EU) 2022/2555) and the Digital Operational Resilience Act ('DORA', (EU) 2022/2554). These regulations were designed to strengthen the resilience of the single market in the face of new security challenges. The Council convened an ad hoc committee on crisis preparedness and resilience in the autumn of 2022, which resolved to continue the work on strengthening the EU's crisis mechanisms.<sup>17</sup> This resolution was motivated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which had galvanised the EU's political decision-making machinery in the spring of 2022. It took the Council a few months of watching the events unfold and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022 to recommend protecting the Union's critical infrastructure.<sup>18</sup> The recommendation is politically binding, and it urges the Member States to accelerate the transposition of the new legal framework and to welcome the EU's stronger involvement in the protection of critical infrastructure.

It is the laws and operational mechanisms of the EU that have previously concretised for Finland what it means to be 'part of the West' from the perspective of foreign and security policy. That is why one of the points of the diamond of comprehensive security reaches all the way to Brussels.

### 3 NATO and the rise of civil resilience

Finland's role as 'part of the West' changed when it became a member of NATO. NATO is not only a defence alliance but also a political alliance.

Under the famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 'the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them.' NATO's joint defence capacity is based on an integrated military command structure, a coordinated defence planning process, operational strategies and joint exercises.

<sup>16</sup> For more information about the EU's strategic crisis management framework and its development, see, for example, Strategic crisis management in the EU, Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2022.

<sup>17</sup> Roadmap on strengthening crisis anticipation, preparedness and response in the Council (15476/22).

<sup>18</sup> Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure (2023/C 20/01).

All this is designed to deter a potential attacker from using military force. An important part of prevention is nuclear deterrence.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, NATO is not just about passively sitting back under the nuclear umbrella of the US and the UK; the Parties coordinate their foreign and security policies through NATO's political structure. NATO is therefore also a political forum – and the only one of its kind – where European and North American countries liaise daily on security policy issues.

The ethos of the North Atlantic Treaty is all about defending Western values. This is best exemplified by the preamble, which references the Charter of the United Nations and records the Parties' determination 'to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'.

The change in NATO's operational priorities in the last ten years or so is hardly surprising. The illegal annexation of Crimea and the spark of war that it ignited in the eastern parts of Ukraine demonstrated to NATO that Russia had isolated itself from the rule-based world order and was pursuing an aggressive foreign and security policy to oppress and control its neighbours. Russia therefore deserved to be merited as the most significant and direct threat to the security of NATO countries, surpassing the threat of terrorism. The strategic environment is also increasingly marked by instability to the south (Middle East, North Africa, Sahel), the rise of China as well as phenomena that other organisations, too, are having to deal with – the growing significance of the cyber environment, the fight for control over emerging technologies, the erosion of the non-proliferation of weapons and climate change. All these developments forced NATO to re-examine its core beliefs. The new strategic concept that was adopted at the 2022 Madrid Summit reflects this.<sup>20</sup> If NATO's original operating environment was the Cold War era and the second was the age of crisis management and the war against terrorism that began in the 1990s, we have now entered a third phase, which is all about deterrence and defence in a new, disorderly world.<sup>21</sup> NATO is once again preparing to defend its territories and borders, as it did during the Cold War. Geopolitical changes, new forms of warfare and the modernisation and digitalisation of society have nevertheless also created new threats. The old operating models of the Cold War have become outdated.

NATO had already reacted to the changing global landscape in its previous strategic concept (2010), which sought to promote all aspects of civil resilience in response to new security threats. This new normal was first recognised in a document called 'Commitment to enhance resilience', which was adopted at the 2016 Warsaw Summit.<sup>22</sup> This was also when the Parties agreed on what would become the key elements of NATO's concept of civil resilience. Three core functions of civil resilience were identified: (1) continuity of government; (2) continuity

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<sup>19</sup> Defence strategies are also being rewritten rapidly now. See *The Economist*, 2 July 2023: 'Shaping up and tooling up – NATO is drafting new plans to defend Europe'.

<sup>20</sup> NATO 2022 Strategic Concept; for more information about the background and significance of strategic concepts, see Martti Koskeniemi's opinion of 18 January 2023 to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Finland on government proposal HE 315/2022 vp on the ratification and entry into force of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and International Staff. Koskeniemi calls attention to the dynamics of NATO as an international organisation – and the expansion of its competence through strategic concepts.

<sup>21</sup> For perspectives, see, for example, Thierry Tardy (ed): *NATO's New Strategic Concept*, NDC Research paper No 25, September 2022.

<sup>22</sup> Available online at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133180.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm).

of essential services to the population; and (3) civil support to military operations. The core functions form the basis of NATO's seven baseline requirements of civil resilience, known as the 7BR. They are designed to act as yardsticks against which the Parties can measure their national resilience capacities. The baseline requirements are (1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; (2) resilient energy supplies; (3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; (4) resilient food and water resources; (5) ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises; (6) resilient civil communications systems (such as telecommunications and cyber networks); and (7) resilient transport systems.<sup>23</sup>

The role of civil resilience in the operation of NATO has grown ever stronger in recent years. Improved resilience is one of the nine items on the NATO 2030 agenda, which was adopted at the 2021 Brussels Summit. The justifications for bolstering resilience were robust and reminiscent of the Finnish model of comprehensive security: military capability is built on civil societies – and the enemy is targeting its hostile influence directly at civil society, attempting to circumvent military defence.<sup>24</sup> The Strengthened Resilience Commitment, also adopted at the 2021 Brussels Summit, provides more detail on the baseline requirements in order to accelerate the resilience policy agreed five years previously. According to that document, the Parties' aim is 'a more integrated and better-coordinated approach to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure that their militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis and conflict'.<sup>25</sup> The document identifies national and collective resilience as an essential basis for the effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks and credible deterrence and talks about the need for the Parties to come together and bolster efforts to meet new security challenges. However, the document also notes that resilience remains a national responsibility. What is interesting from the perspective of the Finnish model of comprehensive security is that NATO's Strengthened Resilience Commitment advocates for a broad approach – working across the whole of government and together with various other stakeholder groups.<sup>26</sup>

The 2022 Strategic Concept identified civil resilience as even more of a priority: 'The Strategic Concept emphasizes that ensuring *our national and collective resilience is critical* to all

<sup>23</sup> A public overview is available on NATO's website at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_132722.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm). What civil resilience entails in practice from the perspective of each Party and the Alliance as a whole is recorded in other – mostly classified – documents. It is clear that the baseline requirements, for example, are worded very generically in the public overview. Just translating them into other languages creates ambiguity and a risk of misinterpretation.

<sup>24</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf); 'Resilience is our *first line of defence* and it is essential for NATO to successfully fulfil its three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Our militaries require resilient civilian infrastructure and services to operate effectively in peace, crisis or conflict. Resilience is also key to pushing back on potential adversaries who use a broad range of military, political and economic tools to try to weaken our societies and undermine Allied security.'

<sup>25</sup> Available online at [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_185340.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm).

<sup>26</sup> Paragraph 9 reads as follows: 'Strengthening our resilience requires a broad approach. *We will work across the whole of government, with the private and non-governmental sectors*, with programmes and centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies, and with our societies and populations, to strengthen the resilience of our nations and societies. We will do so in an inclusive manner, including through integrating gender perspectives in the context of our Women, Peace and Security policy. We will strengthen public communication as part of our overall approach.'

our core tasks and underpins our efforts to safeguard our nations, societies and shared values.<sup>27</sup> Some had expected a still greater emphasis on civil resilience.<sup>28</sup> The increased focus on resilience was concretised by the establishment of a new senior Resilience Committee (RC) to replace the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC), which had been established in the 1950s. The RC reports directly to the North Atlantic Council, and its responsibilities include coordinating the 'whole-of-government' and 'whole-of-society' perspectives in NATO's operations.

The pressure to strengthen NATO's civil resilience is expected to increase further in the coming years, partly as a result of the situation in Ukraine and other recent crises.<sup>29</sup> The Parties and the entire Alliance will also have to face the new world order and the most influential forces behind it: China, technological innovation and climate change.<sup>30</sup>

#### **4 Reform of the Finnish model of comprehensive security**

These same challenges are also facing Finland. A number of initiatives are under way to reform the Finnish model of comprehensive security. Russia's war of aggression and Ukraine's fight for survival play a big role in this process.

The path for Finland's finding its place in NATO and the future of the Finnish model of comprehensive security are set out in the Government Programme. The Government's vision includes '*being influential and proactive in NATO*, the European Union, the UN and international relations otherwise'. However, the priorities of Finland's NATO membership are yet to be decided and will be set out in the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy and the Defence Policy Report at the start of the new term of government. The Government is also prepared to draft more detailed legislation on Finland's NATO membership as well as hybrid and cyber influence activities if necessary.<sup>31</sup>

The most significant of the current legislative processes is the comprehensive reform of the Emergency Powers Act, which is being drafted by the Ministry of Justice. The process is based on an entry in the previous Government Programme, according to which, 'in addition to tra-

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<sup>27</sup> NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> Keller saw the 2022 Strategic Concept as a missed opportunity: 'Elevating resilience would have provided a broader understanding of defence and security, placing domestic preparations of member states into focus. The interplay between military and civilian actors in crisis response, the role of NATO publics in hardening our defence and the continuum from conventional military attack to cyber or non-state actor attack on critical infrastructure would all have received greater and much-needed attention. Making resilience more central would also have increased NATO's role as a political forum for all member states (and societies) to discuss their broader security concerns. It is a missed opportunity, a sacrifice to strengthen consensus on the status quo.' Patrick Keller: The new status quo concept, p. 37 in Thierry Tardy (ed): NATO's New Strategic Concept, NDC Research Paper No 25, September 2022.

<sup>29</sup> Views about what to expect vary widely. See, for example, an opinion voiced at the Atlantic Council think tank on what NATO should learn from the COVID-19 pandemic: Jaclyn Levy: The best defense – Why NATO should invest in resilience, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-best-defense-why-nato-should-invest-in-resilience/>.

<sup>30</sup> See Benedetta Berti, et al: Strategic Shifts and NATO's new Strategic Concept, NDC Research Paper No 24, June 2022.

<sup>31</sup> A strong and committed Finland, Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government, 20 June 2023, Publications of the Finnish Government 2023:60.



ditional military threats, Finland is preparing – *in accordance with the model of comprehensive security* and through legislative reform – to meet more multifaceted threats, which combine military and non-military means.<sup>32</sup> The number-one objective of the process is to update the law to reflect ‘modern understanding of comprehensive security and threats to society.’<sup>33</sup> The provisions on, for example, the authorities’ preparedness obligations will undoubtedly have to be carefully reworded to account for the current security environment.

There are also other legislative processes initiated under both the current and previous Governments that seek to modernise the concept of comprehensive security. One good example is the transposition of the CER Directive into Finnish law, which also includes examining the security of critical infrastructure from a national perspective.<sup>34</sup>

There are also plans to begin a comprehensive reform of the laws governing security of supply.<sup>35</sup> Security of supply and the organisations involved in ensuring security of supply are critical elements of comprehensive security. But what are the effects of the recent geopolitical shifts and changes in the security environment on security of supply? Much remains to be decided but, according to the Government Programme, ‘security of supply will be strengthened by developing international cooperation through the EU and NATO and bilaterally with other states.’<sup>36</sup>

It is not just laws that are changing; the strategic layer also needs to be revised. A new point needs to be added to the ‘diamond’ of comprehensive security to account for NATO, and a meaningful role needs to be found for NATO in the Finnish holistic approach. The process of revising Finland’s Security Strategy for Society will also involve a careful examination of the lessons learned from the crises that have rocked the world in recent years.<sup>37</sup>

## 5 Conclusions

Reforming the Finnish model of comprehensive security is inevitable now that Russia’s war aggression has irrevocably transformed our security environment. The war in Ukraine gave Finland the push it needed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and NATO membership alone now forces us to re-examine our own security solutions. There are lessons to

<sup>32</sup> Memorandum on the establishment of a working group to oversee the reform of the Emergency Powers Act, 29 September 2022.

<sup>33</sup> <https://oikeusministerio.fi/valmiuslaki-uudistuu>; this legislative process is supported by academic research on legal resilience: Antti Aine – Veli-Pekka Nurmi – Vesa Valtonen: Oikeuden resilienssi, perusoikeudet ja kokonaisturvallisuus [Legal resilience, constitutional rights and comprehensive security], Lakimies 6/2022, pp. 841–873.

<sup>34</sup> Decision to set up a legislative project to identify entities critical to the functioning of society and improve the resilience of critical infrastructure, 7 December 2022, VN/18947/2022.

<sup>35</sup> See Government Report on Security of Supply, Publications of the Finnish Government 2022:59, pp. 53–54.

<sup>36</sup> A strong and committed Finland, Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo’s Government, 20 June 2023, Publications of the Finnish Government 2023:60.

<sup>37</sup> See, for example, a column written by Secretary General for the Security Committee Petri Toivonen on 31 May 2021: <https://vnk.fi/-/paasihteeri-petri-toivonen-ennakointiyhteisty-o-on-oleellinen-osa-yhteiskuntamme-elintarkeiden-toimintojen-turvaamista>.

be learned from Ukraine's response to the war as Finland rethinks its holistic approach to security.

Since becoming a member of NATO in the spring of 2023, Finland's relationship with the Alliance has changed significantly from the Partnership-for-Peace era. Politically speaking, a number of countries – most notably the United States – now view Finland not as a friendly partner but as an ally. This has inevitably also led to a new kind of foreign and security policy, which will take some learning. Finland is still looking for its place in NATO and remains undecided on issues such as civil resilience.<sup>38</sup> This can be explained by the unprecedented speed at which Finland's accession to NATO was ultimately reached: the civil service apparatus is still adjusting.

It is important to note that Finland joined NATO just as the Alliance is about to adopt a new strategic position. NATO has realised that the security of its members does not actually require rapid deployment forces and capability to operate in far-away places. The Alliance is now facing an opponent who is partial both to traditional heavy warfare and to attacking critical infrastructure and 'just generally being nasty', and who is seeking to establish different values and a different world order. On top of that, there is a major shift in global geopolitics under way.

Despite its importance, civil resilience is peripheral to both traditional foreign and security policy and pure military defence. This is why civil resilience may be difficult to promote while NATO is perceived as a purely military alliance. However, NATO is also a political organisation, which has identified civil resilience as one of its priorities and adopted a holistic approach to promoting civil resilience – an approach that has a lot in common with the Finnish concept of comprehensive security.

From the perspective of Finnish security policy, the biggest risk with NATO membership is that our national model of comprehensive security gets superseded by NATO's inconsistent, rather unsophisticated and clearly politically charged civil resilience model. This is what happened to the Estonian territorial defence model when Estonia joined the Alliance: NATO's strategic concept in the early 2000s was not compatible with Estonia's national defence policy.<sup>39</sup> I do not see the same happening with Finland, however. My prediction is that NATO's emerging civil resilience model will act as a stimulus and a yardstick against which Finland can measure the evolution of our national model of comprehensive security. Finland could even contribute to the reform of the Alliance's civil resilience policy. Finland has been successful in building and maintaining a system of comprehensive security, and it would there-

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<sup>38</sup> For more information about the core elements of Finland's NATO policy, see, for example, Matti Pesu: Finland's emergent NATO policy, *Baltic Rim Economies*, May 2023, Issue #2. There is no reason why Finland's traditional recipe of social equality and democracy could not also work in the new era of NATO membership; see Janne Kuusela: Northern European security and defence in the new era, *Baltic Rim Economies*, May 2023, Issue #2.

<sup>39</sup> Leo Kunnas: 'Viron sodankuvien kaksintaistelu – Miten liittyminen Natoon vaikutti virolaiseen sodankuvaan?' ['Duality of the Estonian view of war – How did joining NATO affect the Estonian approach to war?'] pp. 39–69 in Mika Hyytiäinen (ed): *Tuleva sota – Nykyhetki ennakointien valossa* [War of the future – How today looks in the light of past predictions], National Defence University, 2018. Kunnas's perspective culminates on page 69 as follows: 'It is worth remembering that, in a major international military alliance, the national interests of small, peripheral countries are not what the big countries and the leaders of the alliance are there to protect. [...] It is up to each country to stand up for its national interests.'

fore be natural for NATO and the Allied countries to seek Finland's input on their respective processes. Finland should do its best to advise its new allies on best practices and help them to hone their national capabilities to promote the common good.

One of the key lessons to learn from the war in Ukraine is that Russia is not afraid to engage in total war. What this means is that the war is not just being waged on the battlefields, where the fighting still has all the horrors of the world wars and where new lessons are being learned about the nature of warfare,<sup>40</sup> but across the whole of society.<sup>41</sup> Russia's resorting to this kind of hybrid warfare is unlikely to have come as a surprise to security policy experts. Pynnönniemi, for example, has called attention to how the Russian model of modern warfare comes down to '*a coordinated use of armed forces and political, economic, information and other non-military activities, together with the exploitation of the protest potential of the population and the use of special forces*'.<sup>42</sup> Even cyberspace has turned into a battlefield, where various governmental operators, hacker groups, businesses and others fight for supremacy.<sup>43</sup> For Russia, total war also means that the civilian population and civilian infrastructure are not off limits either. Preparing for this kind of warfare requires a whole-of-society approach. That is why it is important that our national model of comprehensive security retains the dimension that is not based on military capability but on continuity and the ability of society to survive crises and bounce back.<sup>44</sup> These new forms of warfare are challenging not just our model of comprehensive security but also lawmakers. Is it even possible to legislate for specific scenarios and clear mandates when the invader has decided to ignore all fundamental rules of war?

One of the strengths of legal history is its ability to illustrate how crises act as catalysts for change. The time for that will come later. Now that the masks are off, it is vital that we analyse the actions that the Ukrainian society has taken so far in its fight against the invasion that began in the spring of 2022. Ukraine's transition from managing a territorially limited conflict to defending against total war serves as a crucial example for us as we take the next steps towards comprehensive security.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>40</sup> The Economist Special Report, 8 July 2023: Lessons from Ukraine, especially 'The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield', <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023-07-08>; and The Economist, 12 September 2023: 'Counsels of war – Are Ukraine's tactics working?.'

<sup>41</sup> For an analysis of hybrid warfare and how to defend against such campaigns, see Shota Gvineria: Collapse of Russia's hybrid warfare, Baltic Rim Economies, May 2023, Issue #2.

<sup>42</sup> Katri Pynnönniemi: The Concept of hybrid war in Russia – A national security threat and means of strategic coercion, Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 27, May 2021. For more conclusions on warfare, see also, for example, Jyri Raitasalo: Some implications of the war in Ukraine – A perspective from Finland, Baltic Rim Economies, May 2023, Issue #2.

<sup>43</sup> For a legal perspective on this, see Peter B M J Pijpers: Exploiting cyberspace – International legal challenges and the new tropes, techniques and tactics in the Russo-Ukraine War, Hybrid CoE Papers 15, October 2022.

<sup>44</sup> Even before the year 2022, this school of thought was advocated by Kari Pelkonen and Axel Hagelstam, who have also written about strengthening the resilience of NATO and the EU, in their article 'Yhteiskunnan resilienssi – perusta myös puolustukselle' ['Social resilience – another cornerstone of defence'] in the Finnish military periodical Sotilasaikakauslehti 5/2021.

<sup>45</sup> The Ukrainian society has now entered a new phase in which, war has become part of a new horrific normal, The Economist, 23 September 2023: 'To endure a long war, Ukraine is remaking its army, economy and society.' The quote is from social scientist *Darina Solodova*.